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Th is paper is the second part of a general study on the relationship between Nishida 
and Chinese philosophy. In the fi rst, I explored the extent to which Nishida’s 
philosophy was infl uenced, directly and indirectly, explicitly and implicitly, 
historically and conceptually, by materials coming from the intellectual horizon 
of Chinese thought. I concentrate here on Nishida’s own position toward what 
he understood by “Chinese philosophy.” Is this philosophy, so suggestive for 
Nishida, promoted to a central place in his work or not, and if so, in what sense 
might we take this idea of “centrality” as specifi cally Chinese? In setting forth 
several archetypes of Chinese thought present in Nishida’s philosophy, the focus 
of this article falls on the methodological, logical and metaphysical contrasts we 
can identify between the Japanese philosopher and Chinese philosophy as his 
underground intellectual sources.
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有無相生
Th ere is and there is not are born from one another
Laozi, II
Introduction
Nishida Kitarō?西田幾多郎 (1870–1945) used to say: “We have to refi ne in a new 
way the ore of Eastern culture that includes such precious metals.2 I am a miner forever. I do 
not even have time to refi ne the mine stones.”3 Cheung Ching-yuen 張政遠 comments that 
“mining and refi ning are two diff erent processes. Nishida’s philosophy may have its Eastern or 
Japanese origin, but it can be refi ned in a way to realize its full potential.”4 In fact, these two 
processes of mining and refi ning seem to follow the intimate phenomenality of Nishida’s own 
“logic of place.” “To refi ne” can be understood as the act of giving shape to a pure, though 
“still not refi ned metal, dug out as such from a mountain;” or in topological terms, it might 
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be understood as extracting the essence of that which already exists condensed in place, and 
ontologizing the emptying suchness. By contrast, “to mine” would be to prospect infi nitely 
in the emptying depth of reality. Th is being so, what is to be refi ned or mined here? How can 
we understand Nishida’s position regarding “Eastern culture”? And indeed what did “Eastern 
culture” mean for him? From the arguments given in the major essay he devoted to the question 
(Nishida, 1933), we can answer that a signifi cant part of what he understood by “Eastern 
culture” was “Chinese culture.” So, the question arises: What is Nishida’s own position on 
“Chinese culture”? What kind of “ore” should be refi ned here, and why? 
In the fi rst part of this essay, I explore the extent to which Nishida’s philosophy has been 
infl uenced, directly and indirectly, explicitly and implicitly, historically and conceptually, by 
materials coming from the intellectual horizon of Chinese thought. In the conclusion to the 
fi rst part, I demonstrate that a kind of dialectical relation concerning non being and being 
divided the positions of major Chinese thinkers, in relation to the theories of the Japanese 
philosopher. It appeared to Nishida possible then to go a step further and show that this relation 
possesses a wider philosophical range, if described through the categories of ontology (theory of 
being), “meontology” (theory of non being) and “neontology” (theory of absolute nothingness). 
However, our inquiry reaches here a turning point. For we are now no longer simply 
analyzing infl uences in turn, we are interpreting one philosophy within the conceptual frame 
of another. For this reason, the study of Nishida’s own position toward “Chinese philosophy” 
acquires an urgency. So our problem is this: Is this “philosophy”—so suggestive for Nishida 
—promoted to a “central” place in Nishida’s work or not, and if it is, in what sense might we 
take this idea of “centrality” as specifi cally “Chinese”? In setting forth several archetypes of 
Chinese thought present in Nishida, I focus here on a growing contrast between the Japanese 
philosopher and Chinese philosophy as one of his underground intellectual sources.
I. Ontology or Meontology?
On a strictly linguistic level, we can note that the primitive meaning of wu 無 in Chinese 
is not “nothingness” but rather “ (there) is not,” “negation,” and it refers to an opposition to 
“being” or rather “(what) there is” (you 有).5 Might we go further and claim that Chinese 
philosophy takes this opposition as its own vital operation?
1. A Paradox between Subordination and/or Opposition
A fi rst intellectual confl ict in China had already taken place in a kind of alternative space 
between meontology and ontology. Confucius stressed the originality of “nothingness” as 
sociality and “ritual reciprocity,” while Mozi claimed the primacy of what can be called “human 
beings,” that is, private individuals, who only secondarily take part in society, insofar as the 
analogy of the “social contract” can be used.6 We now face in the Laozi 老子 the unfamiliar idea 
that we have to “prefer the weak to the strong, non acting to acting, the underside to the top, 
ignorance to knowledge, etc.”7 “Preference” here does not mean “exclusion” but rather a choice 
within an already complementary couple. In a philosophy of action, the notion of preference 
refers to an existential act of individual adhesion, whose apparent contingency eventually turns 
into a testimony of liberty. Th e preference in question here leads in the end to the following 
“paradox”: that “fullness” (“there is”) opposes “void” (“there is not”), and that “nothing has 
more value than something, that void [has more value] than fullness, and that “there is 
not” (wu) surpasses the “there is” (you).”8 Th is paradox encompasses, on the one hand, the 
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ideological and socio-political position of Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (195–115 bc), who argued 
the “subordination of earth to sky, of yin to yang,”9 and, on the other hand, the cosmological 
position of Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53–18 bc), who argued for a non hierarchical, synchronized 
interchange between yin and yang (sky/earth, void/full, father/son). As Cheng would have it:
Cosmology in Yang Xiong integrates, as it must do, the four seasons (representing for 
time what the four orients are for space) as well as the Five Phases and, as in many Han 
exegetes of the Book of Changes, numbers are perceived as a principle of synchronicity 
that settles the correspondences between men and the cosmos. Th is schematic representation 
of natural processes, contrary to the teleological vision of Dong Zhongshu, does not 
include any judgment of value.?Yin and yang, for example, are not related as superior 
and inferior, but according to an interchange in equal proportion.10
Th is paradox returns later:
Th e inaugural statement [Laozi 28]: “Without ultimate, but (and/or) supreme ultimate!” 
(wuji er taiji 無極而太極) will become the object of a famous controversy in the twelfth 
century between Zhu Xi and his contemporary Lu Xiangshan, mainly centered on the 
particle er 而. Should we understand that the topless precedes the supreme ultimate 
(wuji, then taiji) according to the conception of the Laozi 40: “A thousand beings under 
the sky are born from the there-is (you), the there-is is born from the there-is-not (wu)”? 
Or is the topless rather simply appended to the supreme ultimate (wuji and taiji), as if 
it were all about the same thing under two diff erent names?11
However, the paradox itself in the Laozi seems polarized on the priority of the wu, logically, 
according to the idea of a “preference,” and practically, according to the idea of an effi  cacy of 
nothingness:
Th irty spokes converge at the hub. But it is precisely where there is nothing that the 
utility of the chariot lies. One kneads clay to make a vessel. But it is where there is 
nothing that the utility of the container lies. We open doors and windows to make a 
room. But it is where nothing is that the utility of the room lies. Th us the there-is shows 
some commodities, and the there-is-not transform these commodities into  utilities.12
As A. Cheng comments, “Th e paradox reaches here its highest point: absence would have more 
presence than what is here; void would have an effi  ciency that fullness has not.”13 
2. A Contradiction to Escape the Paradox?
It goes without saying that such a conception of the effi  ciency of void is crucial to an 
understanding of the depth of the speculations Nishida devoted to nothingness, which be 
identifi ed fi rstly with a “snapping in” (Einschnappen), and then with “absolute nothingness” 
(zettaimu 絶対無); it is no less crucial to an appreciation of the scope of his “poiesistic” 
(poieshisuteki ポイエシス的) philosophy of “intuition in action” [or “intuition in the 
making”] (kōiteki chokkan 行為的直観).14 Nevertheless, we ought to note that “fullness” and 
“void” appear as opposites within the frame of the above paradox, notwithstanding either the 
matter of primacy, or the essential dynamics of the yin yang couple in Chinese cosmological 
thinking.15 In other words, primacy exists only to emphasize the complementary nature of 
the opposites: “To set forth something is at the same time to set forth its contrary” in order to 
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discard “distinctions and oppositions we make following habit or convention.”16 Th e paradox 
is thus not a contradiction, but rather appears within the compass of a positive and circular 
principle:
When everyone takes beauty as beauty, then comes the ugly.
When everyone takes the good as good, then comes the evil.
Th ere-is and there-is-not produce each other.17
“Produce each other” (or “are born from one another”) means that without the fi rst, the 
second does not appear. In Chinese, you and wu are not simply words or verbs, but antonyms, 
dependent on each other, as are so many other key philosophical terms in Chinese philosophy. 
In meontological terms, being produces non being and non being produces being within the 
frame of an infi nite reciprocal, to yield a “place of oppositional nothingness,” or a place where 
being is not determined alone, but opposes non being. In 1934, Nishida argued:
Even if we call Daoist culture a culture of non being, it is still imprisoned in non being 
(mu 無), captured in the form of non being. Its present was not a moving one but a 
simple infi nite present.”18 
Th e end of Nishida’s statement shows that his “eternal now” (eien no ima 永遠の今) 
was not “a simple infi nite present” (tada mugen no genzai 唯無限の現在), or a sort of eternal 
reciprocal pulsation staying in the same place. It operates rather as a transitive “moving 
present” (ugoku genzai 動く現在), because time itself is spreading from the intimate “trans-
locatisation” of reality.19 Now, the statement as a whole demands we rid ourselves of usual 
conceptions of nothingness as “pure nothing,” for instance in Parmenides, Pan?ontologism, 
Nihilism, or as “non being,” as it is encountered in Platonism, Bergsonism, but also—as in the 
“alternative space” mentioned earlier—in a certain line of thought in Chinese philosophy, and 
in some expressions of Indian philosophy and religion.20 Especially with regard to Daoism, 
the statement means that what Nishida understood as “absolute nothingness” remains 
“imprisoned,” restricted, and eventually transformed into a contrasting conception (“moral,” 
“ritual,” “practical,” “pragmatic”): a reciprocal and eff ective complementary opposition to 
being. Th is imprisonment corresponds “metaphysically” to the “spatiality” and eternal “solid 
organisation” that he considered as characteristic of ancient Chinese society.21 Already, we need 
to insist on the fact that this is much more a metaphysical and topological characterization of 
the essence of Chinese thought than it is a condemnation of it.
In contrast, and according to a crucial distinction in operation between “spatiality” and 
“place” (basho), Nishida’s “logic of place” (bashoteki ronri 場所的論理) searches for the “unity 
without form” (katachi naki tōitsu 形なき統一 ) of time that retreats from any (solid) spatial 
form left behind.22 Th e “void” (kū 空) is the “sky” (or the “sea”) in the sense of a depth so 
infi nite that we might say that its blueness becomes blackness.23 But doing so, we are once 
more approaching Chinese thought, rather than escaping from it. I think in particular of the 
following description by Cheng: 
Yang Xiong is inclined to substitute for the notion of “mutation” (yi 易) the notion of 
xuan 玄, a term borrowed from the fi rst chapter of the Laozi and generally translated 
as “mystery,” while denoting originally azure so deep that it becomes black. Th is notion 
is then preferentially associated with the sky, to such an extent that taixuan 太玄 could 
be nothing but another name, if not another form, of taiyi 太一, the “supreme one” to 
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whom the Han devoted an imperial cult.24
To distinguish Nishida’s position from the Daoist conception, one has to probe 
topologically deeper into this mysterious depth of an empty sky, somehow identifi ed as a 
supreme unity, and?as a place of nothingness hosting an infi nite operation of unifi cation. In 
other words, kong 空 deepens as “the fact of emptying” (kū suru koto 空すること). We might 
also use the image of a “black hole” from where the light of being cannot escape. Nishida 
described such a retreating, deepening eff ect as the “operation of emptying oneself.”25 In short, 
the subordination in Nishida does not follow the principle of complementarity as in Chinese 
thought. Instead, his space of complementarity stands and hangs problematically within the 
place of nothingness of complementarity that is being and non being. 
In this context, we may usefully refer to Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1078), who interestingly 
refused any subordination that relied on preference or negativity, and thus defended a sort 
of parallelism. Th is parallelism can be expressed in the terminology of the Laozi: to have at 
the same time both “wuji or taiji” and “wuji and taiji.” Zhang tried to reduce the opposition 
opened by Huilin (慧林, fi fth century) between the Daoist wu and the Buddhist xu, and search 
for the “unifying principle” of the old controversy about “pure immanentism.”26 As A. Cheng 
explains: “In Wang Bi [the qi] is the undiff erentiating fund [or ground] (wu), void (xu 虚), 
that enables the arising of all things, but at the same time, it is, as in Guo Xiang, all that there 
is (you).”27
Zhang Zai argues: 
Th e qi, originally in the void, is pure, one, and without form; under the eff ect of 
stimulation, it generates [yin/yang], and condenses (ju 聚) itself in visible fi gures.28 Th e 
Dao of the Sky Earth is nothing more than making fullness from the extreme void . . . . 
As time goes by, even gold and the metals end up disintegrated, the highest mountains 
eroded (cui 摧); everything that has a form is destroyed (huai 壊). Only the Supreme 
Void, being immovable, is the highest point of fullness.29
Void is superior to fullness while becoming fullness in the “condensation” process, with 
no “return” (contra Daoists such as Wang Bi) but rather a coming and going movement, which 
is real and not illusory (contra the Buddhists).30 In brief, the supreme void (taixu 太虚) is 
not a fi nite void, complete in itself: it is an infi nite void, so empty that it has to fi ll itself. 
Conversely, the supremely plain and true evanescent nature is the supreme void (“erosion” 
in time). Th ere is only this “non?duality” (yi wu er 一無二) of the “original nature” (xing 性) 
of qi. A human being, as a body, is both blood and bones; as an individual, both spirit and 
bodily “transformations” (hua 化); as a mortal, both death and life.31 Th is dialectic represents a 
“supreme harmony” (taihe 太和) that A. Cheng describes as
a double fundamental process, a kind of vital respiration in two moments: inspiration/
expiration, expansion/contraction, dispersion/condensation. According to this binary 
rhythm, inherent in the complementary bipolarity of the yin (concentration) and the 
yang (dispersion), the undiff erentiated qi crystallizes in visible forms and then dissolves 
itself again, as water solidifi es while freezing and then spills while melting.32 
According to Zhang Zai:
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Advent and collapse alternate according to a universally necessary cycle. . . Supreme void 
is pure. Being pure, it is without obstruction. Being without obstruction, it is spiritual. 
Th e contrary of the pure is the unclear; the unclear is obstruction and obstruction 
produces forms.33
In this cycle, Zhang Zai is trying both to “unify the there-is and the there-is-not” and to 
unify nothingness itself as the unity that seems to encompass wu and xu.34 At any rate, here again, 
the prevailing model, so to speak, becomes the synchronic coming and going cycle; in brief, the 
essential mutation. I have demonstrated that this is not logically the fundamental sense of the 
“absolute contradictory self-identity” in Nishida.35 Why then is the self-identity “absolutely self-
contradictory”? Th e answer is not because it is a simple alternation of contraries nor because it 
is an infi nite graduating process, but rather because it represents both aspects, polarized not on 
the fi rst but on the second. In some sense, this kind of performative contradiction is an attempt 
to escape the paradoxical place where Chinese thought seems precisely to blossom. How can 
Nishida pretend, then, that we have here a kind of imprisonment? What, more precisely, is his 
position regarding Chinese philosophy, given the infl uences he received from it?
II. Infl uences of Chinese Philosophy and the Philosophy of Classical Chinese Culture
Let us return to the distinction made above between “to refi ne” and “to mine”, and re-
member that the operation of refi ning was related to “Eastern” and Chinese culture. Th e “ore of 
Eastern culture” acquires here the face of a new precious metal. Indeed, ancient China was eager 
to recover through the “ritual spirit” (li 礼), the “very sinew of the universe,” as its intimate 
“organizing” process according to the image of “natural veins of jade.”36 We can concur with  L. 
Vandermeersch when he writes: 
Chinese thought is characterized by the spirit of the lapidary, in which one experiences 
the resistance of the jade and uses all one’s art only to take advantage of the meaning 
of the layers of rough matter, in order to isolate from it the pre-existing form within, 
unconceivable before discovering it.37
Th is ritual aspect of Chinese culture (wen 文) is refl ected in its language and writing. 
Compared to Western philosophy, it refers admittedly to a philosophical style based more on 
canonicity, “the literature of commentaries” on the Classics, than on “personal expression,” 
“research of originality” or “clear expression of ideas.”38 Chinese characters do not defi ne an 
“algebra” for a “universal language” adequate to thinking (as Leibniz thought), but rather a 
system of signs that can be read and pronounced distinctively by diff erent populations.39  Th us, 
the genuine signifi cation of rituality is cultural. As M. Granet explains: “Th e function of human 
thought is not pure knowledge, but a civilizing action: to secrete a total and active ordering.”40 
Th is point seems to have been determinant for the scope of Nishida’s understanding of Chinese 
culture.41 Nishida argued that all culture, and not only Chinese culture, possesses this ritual 
aspect and so “conserves” (iji suru 維持する) itself. Th ere are some grounds for defi ning 
“culture” as a living link with the past. He argued that the past is somehow joining and merging 
with the present. In one direction, this can be understood as the possibility of “transforming” 
the past, as in moral and religious “repentance” for instance. In another , it can be understood 
in the idea that ancient cultures (such as the Greek and the Indian) can still return to modify the 
present.42 Philosophically speaking, a leading condition for the emergence of historical science 
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is not only the ontological existence and epistemic testimony of the past, but the topological 
inherence of the past in the present. For Nishida, something like historical science would be 
impossible if past, present and even future were isolated from one another: “In history, if a 
period is conceived as a center, innumerable periods are conceived as simultaneously existing.”43
Nevertheless, Nishida sought a philosophical reason to explain why this ritual aspect was 
especially present in Chinese culture. So, while celebrating the greatness of Confucianism, he 
underlined at the same time in his numerous lectures this dominant “ritual social” aspect of 
Classical thought:44
Chinese culture was something extremely special. . . Its source for many thousands of years, 
the culture of the Zhou dynasty [eleventh century to 256 BC], was one in which human 
aff airs, from ceremonial occasions to the slightest human relationships of daily life 
(kankon sōsai kara ōtai inshoku made 冠婚葬祭から応対飲食まで), were as a whole 
imbued with a religion of ritual. . . Probably the cultures of every nation [minzoku 民族] 
assumed the form of Sitte [ritual customs]. As they developed, some of them deepened 
and enlarged philosophically [Greek, Christian], others religiously [Indian, Jewish]. 
However, [the point is that] in China, we can think that Sitte developed itself as Sitte... 
Xunzi said “Th e sage kings considered human nature as evil. Th ey regarded it as one-
sided [self-interested, partial], greedy, and perverse, and as rebellious and not peaceful. 
Th erefore, they created rituals and established systems of law in order to reform and 
improve man’s emotions; and thereby to rectify man. . . ”45 To the very end, the Chinese 
attached themselves to ritual teachings.46 
For Nishida, classical Chinese culture was “moral,” “ritual,” and “urban,” grounded in an 
“immanent worldview” (toshi naizaiteki sekaikan 都市内在的世界観) in which a principle 
deepens and develops in itself, as Hegel had already argued:
Th e Chinese build an old empire. In all their institutions, their constitution, their culture, 
we fi nd something very ancient that has developed from a barbaric beginning up to a 
certain level of culture. However, they do not possess here the sense of the development of 
Spirit, but only a culture that merely keeps standing within its own principle, and so their 
philosophy is something to be considered as coagulated and solidifi ed; for that reason, we 
know of it and cannot but quote abstractions and generalities about it.”47 
In other words, in one direction, this culture assumed ritual form at the level of everyday 
“practice”(xing 行, wei 為), and in another direction: “Ritual must be rooted in heaven,” 48 
heaven being the constant moral “model for the sage king.”49 Moreover, Nishida seems to 
contrast “Chinese culture,” “Confucianism” and “rituality” with its reception in Japan:
Th e infl uence of Chinese culture on my country’s ancient culture was not Confucian, 
but rather institutional and literary. It seems to me that Confucianism became rather 
a social force in the Tokugawa period. I shall not belabor the point that even though 
Japanese art and literature were infl uenced by Chinese culture, they fi nally took a 
specifi c Japanese form. Even the [Neo] Confucianism that developed in my country’s 
later history was not ritualistic, but had rather the character of learning in the China 
of the Sung. Th is was linked to bushidō 武士道. Moreover, I think that it, too, was a 
Confucianism of pure feeling.50 
Nishida also highlights a form of academism and intellectualism in Chinese Huayan 華厳 
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and Tiantai 天台 Buddhism, claiming that Saichō 最澄 (767–822), the founder of Japanese 
Tendai, as well as the great fi gures of Japanese Amidism, Genshin 源信 (942–1017), Hōnen 法
然 (1133–1212), and Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1262) made it more “simple and practical, going 
from the principle to the facts” (ri kara ji e 理から事へ).51 In Japan, Buddhism took on a 
strong “emotional” (jōteki 情的) aspect, as can be seen in the True Pure Land (Jōdo shinshū 浄
土真宗) and Nichiren 日蓮 (1222–1282) sects, where a ritual sect such as Ritsu 律 disappeared 
and “the Shingon 真言 sect was transformed into something Japanese” by Kūkai 空海 (774–
835).52 Perhaps we  can refer to Chan Buddhism (chanzong/zenshū 禅宗) as the “summit of the 
Buddhist adventure in China” and “the quintessence of the Chinese spirit.”53 Nishida, however, 
claims that Chan ceased its evolution after the Tang dynasty (618–907),54 as if the “ritual” and 
“spatial” culture of China would have hindered its expansion, while “maintaining itself alive” 
under other forms in Japan, according to his theory of a conservative unifi cation of “religions.”55 
Maybe forgetting too hastily the tribute his logic pays to Chinese thought, he conceived of 
Chinese culture in the direction of the noematic “condensation” (koka 固化) of the noetic 
fl uctuation of absolute nothingness, a conception most probably infl uenced by Hegel.56
Chinese as well as Indian cultures had something magnifi cent at their foundations. 
However, because they lacked that spirit that searches endlessly [doko made mo 何所ま
でも] for the truth, they became solidifi ed and fi xed in themselves. 57 Only my people 
within Asia, while receiving these infl uences from Eastern cultures, have digested West-
ern culture, and might be considered to have initiated novel creations in Eastern culture. 
Might we take this fact as grounded in this Japanese spirit of going right to things as 
such, without hindrances?58
Nishida’s metaphysical and topological description juxtaposes here three things: a Chinese 
classical culture ritually “developing” (hatten 発展) itself in its own place, in contrast to the 
Hegelian position of pure “stabilization”; a Japanese classical culture “going right to things, 
without hindrances” (torawareru koto naku mono sono mono ni yuku 囚れることなく物そ
のものに行く); and a contemporary Japanese culture suddenly developing itself through its 
contact with other cultures of the world. 
From an historical point of view, Nishida’s approach to Chinese classical traditions of 
thinking echoes the pro Asian ideology and the intellectual atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s. 
Indeed, especially after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, Japan’s Kwantung army was becom-
ing increasingly aggressive in China. Nishida wrote his essay on Eastern culture in 1933 when 
the relations between the two countries were turning to violence and war.59 Yet, as this essay 
will demonstrate below, Nishida’s position is not to be understood integrally as chauvinistic or 
nationalistic.60  It is more about a philosophical diff erence relating to space and time, not only 
in classical Chinese and Japanese cultures, but also in Greek and Roman cultures, rather than 
about the superiority of certain cultures to others.
We see things through acting. Th e actual world determines itself expressively. Our social 
and historical world must have such signifi cance. Various social forms of culture are 
constituted (kōsei serareru 構成せられる) in it. Th e culture of the intellectual nation 
of Greece was, as it were, spatial and geometrical. Eidos can be thought of as spatial. 
But even the pragmatic culture of China did not regard highly the signifi cance of seeing 
things [in the sense of the afore mentioned “intuition in action” or kōiteki chokkan]. It 
too was spatial and exhibited a three dimensional nature. Roman culture was also that 
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way. Ritual and law suggest a three dimensional organisation of society. However, the 
culture of the Japanese nation can be said to be temporal. Emotions fl ow in time. Th e 
Greeks wrote epics and tragedies; the Japanese were already writing lyrical poetry as 
early as the Man’yō period [fi fth to eighth centuries]. Th is is the reason why the tanka 
verse developed in Japan. Th e haiku too captures the world from the perspective of a 
fugitive moment of time.61
Th is is all very well, but if Chinese philosophy considers nothingness (mu) spatially in 
the depth of practice (kōi no soko 行為の底), Japanese aesthetic sensitivity to time can only 
“express” formally an absolute nothingness (zettai mu) identifi ed as a formless, symbolic, and 
generative unity. Nishida writes: 
A culture of feelings [such as Japanese culture] is the form of the formless, the sound 
of the soundless. It is symbolic. It is, like time, a formless unity. A culture of formless 
emotion is, like time, generative; like life, it is developmental. It receives various forms, 
but at the same time advances while developing them according to a certain form. 
Time is not merely a passing and disappearing fl ow. If it were so, the unity of time as 
a unity would never take form. As I have often written, time is the determination of 
non-determination, the form of the formless (gentei naki gentei, katachi naki katachi 限
定なき限定、形なき形). In time, the formless determines form. In such a sense, time 
is the mirror surface of eternity. Th is is why time takes form (seiritsu suru 成立する) 
as the self-determination of absolute nothingness.” In other words, Japanese sensibility 
cannot but feel the noematic determination of absolute nothingness. If Indian religion 
“negates knowledge by knowledge,” and Chinese culture “negates practice by practice,” 
we can add that Greek aesthetic intuition negated time in a spatial direction, while 
Japanese aesthetic intuition negates time in the depths of time itself. . . . Greek aesthetics 
saw the formless within the form (yūkei no naka ni mukei o mita 有形の中に無形を
見た). Not only the distinctive quality (tokushoku 特色) of Japanese aesthetics, but also 
that of all Eastern aesthetics grounded in the thought of nothingness lies in employing 
form to express the formless (katachi ni yotte katachi naki mono o arawasu 形によって
形なきものを表す).62
In other words, within the opposition of Eastern and Greek cultures, Chinese and Japa-
nese cultures belong to the fi rst as cultures of nothingness; but within Eastern culture, Chinese 
culture is a thought of nothingness (mu), while Japanese culture negatively feels absolute noth-
ingness. Such an expression occurs, indeed, within the discourse of a Japanese philosopher sen-
sible to the notion of absolute nothingness. For sure, this solidifi cation, also defi ned as a “spatial 
fi xation,” recalls the solid images of the “veins” and the “spirit of the lapidary.” 63 However, this 
topological account is not a radical condemnation of “classical” Chinese culture, but rather an 
attempt to defi ne its metaphysical characteristic, in the light of a typology. As M. Yusa explains 
in her intellectual biography of Nishida:
Nishida’s essay, “Th e forms of ancient cultures, East and West, seen from a metaphysi-
cal perspective,” is his attempt to formulate a cultural typology. According to Nishida’s 
characterization, Western culture is imbued with Christian spirituality and “sustained 
by being.” In contrast, Oriental—and especially Japanese—culture is sustained by “the 
determination of nothingness.” Th is particular way of contrasting “Christian West and 
Buddhist East” by way of being and nothingness became a locus classicus for those who, 
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in the name of the Kyoto school of philosophy or otherwise, uphold the “supremacy” of 
Oriental Nothingness over Western Being. Nishida’s intention, however, was far from 
that sort of crude taxonomy and dichotomous apologetics. Rather, his was the attempt 
to formulate a cultural typology from a metaphysical perspective. Nishida had always 
held that “each culture must maintain its uniqueness in the global society, even though 
it originally developed itself by interaction with other cultures. Only that way can it 
contribute to the formation of a truly global culture.”64
It must be remembered that in this essay, Nishida begins by saying that he wants to cast 
light upon “essential diff erences between these forms,” that is upon how each of them grasped 
the problem of reality (jitsuzai no mondai 実在の問題). He continues:
Cultures must be the self-awakening content of the world of historical actuality, where 
the individual determination is the universal determination and conversely; originally, 
they cannot be simply reduced to unity. To lose one’s originality is to lose culture. While at 
the same time, the act of going on developing an original culture from the point of view 
of an original culture is not only to progress abstractly towards an individual direction. 
Th at would be no more than negating culture. A true world culture forms and goes about 
forming itself only when diff erent cultures develop themselves as mediations of the world, 
while maintaining their own respective standpoints. Firstly, we must deeply consider the 
very place where each culture takes its ground and stands, and then clarify what stand-
point it takes and what relation it entertains with respect to other cultures. How do 
Eastern and Western cultures diff er in their roots? What signifi cance does Japanese cul-
ture have in Eastern culture? Its strong points are at once its weak points. We can learn 
the path along which we should truly advance only as we both deeply fathom our own 
depths and attain a profound understanding of other cultures.”65
Hence, it is clear that such a typology is not a racist or xenophobic classifi cation of cultures. 
Nishida is even critical here towards the weaknesses of Japanese culture itself. Th e typology in 
this text is based on a topology we will explain below: in the “place of determinate being,” we 
have to “consider the very place where each culture [including Japanese culture] takes its ground 
and stands.” In the “place of oppositional nothingness,” that is of relations, we need to “clarify 
what standpoint it takes and what relations it entertains with respect to other cultures.” Absolute 
nothingness represents the place where these positions and relations take place, including those 
of Japanese culture. In other words, Japan should not to be conceived of as the ultimate place 
of realization of absolute nothingness, as Germany was conceived as the historical locus of the 
realization of Spirit in Hegel. Absolute nothingness is rather an infi nite depth referring to no 
particular culture, but providing the place for diff erent cultural expressions. Nevertheless, it is 
true that Nishida’s later discussions about the role of the Imperial Household in Japan would 
make his position more diffi  cult to interpret and appreciate, and provoke many debates about 
his commitment during these troubled years. We need to stress his prudence, however, and 
read again the above passage, in which he is quite careful in his appreciation of contemporary 
Japanese culture: 
Might we not think,  that the fact that only my people within Asia, while receiving these 
infl uences from Eastern cultures, have digested Western culture and might be consid-
ered (to omowareru と思われる) to have initiated novel creations in Eastern culture, 
is grounded in this Japanese spirit going right to things as such, without hindrances? 66
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Th e essence of Nishida’s notion of place is not a closed unity (gōitsu 合一), in which the 
Chinese character 合 refers to both “unity” and “closing,” excluding all diff erences; 67 nor is it a 
pure reciprocal unity, nor yet a unity within a process of diff érence (in Deleuze’s sense). Rather it 
must be understood as a unifying operation of “hospitality,” although not in Derrida’s meaning 
of that word.68 At this point, let us return to the typology referred to in the above passage. Once 
more, it is explicitly presented as a topology in an eff ort to enlighten the “problem of Chinese 
culture” as distinct from the “problem of Japanese culture.” Th e vocabulary and conceptuality 
used here belong to the logic of place: “Th e very place where each culture takes its ground and 
stands” (yotte tatsu tokoro 拠って立つ所), “on what standpoint it stands” (tachiba ni tachi 
立場に立ち, and “in” (ni oite に於て) Eastern culture. Th e kind of solidifi cation specifi c 
to Chinese culture is no more that a genuine mode of the cultural formation (keisei 形成) of 
the historical world itself, along its endlessly creative path. Such a path does not end with the 
supreme creation of Japanese culture as a summit, a perfect and fi nal unity. In other words, as 
is shown by the emphasis on time in the next quotation, Japanese culture is not only keeping 
alive the cultures of the past but also waiting for the culture to come.
Now, if we probe into the topological dimension of absolute nothingness, we need to ask: 
more generally, is not the vein a part of the jade and this nervure only conceivable within some-
thing? Is not this idea of rituality an ontological-meontological statement, according to which 
ordering and organization of something here and now invalidates the necessity of any deeper 
place such as absolute nothingness? To sum it up in a question to be answered in the following 
section: Does not the notion of suchness still refer to suchness of a pre existing being?
Nishida’s fundamental metaphysical argument about the specifi city of Chinese philosophy 
is at the same time a spatial restriction concerning the absoluteness of nothingness.
Time has neither a place from which it comes into being, nor a place toward which it 
passes away. It arises from and returns into non being. Time must be considered to be 
the self-determination of absolute nothingness. Th us, [it is here that]69 non-being was 
considered as the beginning of heaven and earth (mu ga tenchi no hajime to kangaerareru
無が天地の始めと考えられる). Th is is not to say that Laozi and Zhuangzi con-
sciously entertained such a meaning. However, reality, not only in Laozi and Zhuangzi, 
but in Chinese philosophy (Shina tetsugaku 支那哲学), was considered to exist in the depths 
of practice. Th e fact that they conceived of non being in the very heart of practice must 
have such signifi cance. Th is would seem also to be the reason why, while Legalist phi-
losophers emerged in ancient Chinese culture, there was ultimately not a development 
of the law as in Roman culture.70
Here again, Nishida’s point is not to conceive of Chinese philosophy as inferior, but to 
reveal its dialectical nature which it shares with all cultures: fundamentally spatial, it neverthe-
less unconsciously approaches time. What is more, the practical absolute is not a form of moral 
obligation incarnated in the act; nor it is it a kind of noumenal being, which is at the same time 
the very non being (as it is for Kant). Th e practical absolute is nothingness as an open poiesistic 
depth of creative action refl ected in the infi nity of ritual practice. 71
Still, it might rightly be objected to Nishida’s theory of condensation that the whole his-
tory of Chinese thought itself denounces the idea of “coagulation,”72 especially in the Zhuangzi 
荘子?where we are able us to see a condemnation of “attachment” of spirit to things and “rei-
fi cation.”73 But in response, Nishida in his topology of nothingness sought to point out the 
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very coagulation of the operation of liberation from coagulation, as an endlessly “imprisoned” 
movement of coming and going. Is it then possible to claim that, while the Chinese have “this 
concern of avoiding the risk inherent in the dualism of coagulating the circulation of the vital 
breath” (as Cheng argues), then it is the very circulation itself that coagulates into a non-dual 
form in Chinese thought?74 Th e problem is: Are we “free” when we realize the alternative nature 
of reality or when we escape from it? Are things such as they are in the “mutations” and changes?
III. Th ree Points of Discord
1. Th e Suchness of What?
Th is question of rituality brings us to the topic of the suchness of things. Nishida pointed 
to a famous critique of the relativity of language in the Zhuangzi.75 As A. Cheng explains:
Language cannot tell us something about the reality of things because it sets before us 
not only the names we give to things, but at the same time the things themselves. While 
laying out both “names” (ming 名) and “realities” (shi 実), language is nothing but an 
artifi cial and arbitrary carving-up of reality, in which a vain claim to represent if not a 
medium of knowledge then at least a grasp on reality, can be seen in such affi  rmations 
as: “this is that” shì 是) or “this is not that” (fēi 非).76
In the Zhuangzi, then, there is the following argument:
I consider the fact of affi  rming “this is that,” “this is not that” as a human characteristic. 
For me, to be devoid of it means not letting oneself become internally aff ected by likings 
and dislikings, taking as a rule of life the fact of following the natural course without 
pretending to bring something to life.77
Th e sage must “forget the discourse” referring to “being” (“there is”) and “not being” 
(“there is not”). A. Cheng comments: “We still do not know, what [there] really is or is 
not, from within the there-is or the there-is-not.”78
We know “it” only by “listening and letting things refl ect such as they are.”79 Zhuangzi is 
said to have stopped crying over the death of his wife because he understood that to know the 
vacuity of forms was at the same time to know the fact that there was no thing or nothing to cry 
about.80 Th is is expressed in the Zhuangzi as ci zhong wei de xiao yao you 此中未得逍遥逰. Th e 
end of this expression is known as shōyōyū 逍遥遊, or “the act of conforming oneself to things 
such as they are, without attachment.” In Nishida’s words, such a refusal of a determinate being 
(gentei serareta yū 限定せられた有), corresponding here to the statement “this is that” made 
from the perspective of a fi xed locator, represents an attempt to criticize a human tendency to 
ontologize words, things and persons. At the same time,  such a refusal of an “indeterminate 
being” (“this is not that”) condemns any reduction of nothingness to a simple non being. 
Human beings cry for the paradise lost of being or non being, until they realize the fact that 
this is crying for no thing or nothing; this realization represents a transition from mono ??
(things) to koto ?? (facts). 
Th us, we might fi nd a point of convergence between Chinese thought and Nishida 
philosophy in the idea that the alternative between either being or non being, illustrated for 
example in European medieval scholastic philosophy (realism or nominalism), is not the real 
fundamental problem.81 From one side, this alternative can hinder a real “comprehension of 
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the Chinese debates concerning language in its specifi city.”82 And from other sides, it hides “the 
place of absolute nothingness” approached by philosophers of the Middle Ages, East and West, 
such as Buddhist thinkers (Dōgen, Shinran) and Christian mystics (Boehme, Eckhart, and 
Nicholas of Cusa).83 But the real diff erence between the two perspectives surely dwells within 
the creative aspect. For the Zhuangzi, the ideal of practice is conformity with the operation of 
reality: “Following the natural course without bringing something new to life...” (常因自然，
而不益生也).84
Nevertheless, is not the fact itself of putting aside being and non being in order to conform 
to reality, a kind of return within the frame of being, whether you call it nature, reality, or 
suchness? Th is perspective eventually aims at something. Yet if this something takes place 
beyond words, being and non being, it still refers to the idea of a kind of thing, substance, 
nature. But does not the notion of being return here? For this something must be at least such 
as it is, and it must imply a kind of suchness. Such a suchness is not independent from our 
thoughts and words; rather it has to be recovered. Th is kind of fundamental reality which is 
not a foundation is dynamically expressed in Chinese by several words: wei 為, ye 也, and wu 
物. In occidental languages, though, we can only express it as: “things such as they are.” Yet, 
to forget the self, and refl ect things such as they are as a faithful (non distorting) “mirror” (jing 
鏡),85 is not identical to the operation of a “mirror refl ecting itself ” (jiko jishin o terasu kagami 
自己自身を照らす鏡) to reveal the thing as such.86 But might we conceive of a meaning (yi 
意) apart from things themselves? Can we seriously consider the possibility of leaving any form 
of existence behind?
For the later Nishida, the ideal of acting is rather a creative operation; it coincides with, 
and does not simply conform to, the productive operation of reality. Acting stands in the 
suchness of things as such, in the ungrounded operation of making, and not the ontological 
suchness of things as they are. Th e problem faced by Zhuangzi seems to be this: It is not possible 
to know rationally if being (wei, ye, wu) is real or a dream; we must therefore let things refl ect 
as they are.87 Nishida’s point would be rather: What does this “are” itself mean? Where does it 
take place? Is not being itself the dream we make about a reality that is in fact nothing but a 
“place of absolute nothingness,” thus a place of becoming, of creation? Might we fi nd here the 
reason why Nishida considered Chinese culture as concentrated mainly on the ritual imperative 
of recovering the real nature of things? For Zhuangzi, the destiny of man is to suppress the 
will, but Nishida always maintained as central the notion of a creative will, expressed in actions 
activating the ideas of beauty, unity, goodness and purity in art, politics, morality and religion.88 
And this creative will eventually prevents Nishida philosophy itself from being something 
defi nitely created. In other words, it prevents the place of absolute nothingness from fi lling 
completely either with being or non being. Furthermore, this distinction between tality (talitas) 
of being (such as it is) and pure suchness (as such) matches to a certain extent the diff erence 
between normative and pure suchness.89
Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) identifi es in the idea of principle li 理 an intelligible and 
descriptive part conceived as the natural principle. Th is part is expressed in his description 
about the reality of things, namely their qi: “What makes a thing what it is [What makes a thing 
operate as it operates] (suo yi ran 所以然).” For example, this reality is the fact “that a tree is 
blossoming in spring and drying out in fall,” or that the sovereign is higher than the minister. 
However, there is also a normative counterpart to the expression suo yi ran conceived as an 
ethical principle. Th is part is expressed in the following description about the ritual function of 
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things: “What must be like this (suo dang ran 所当然).” 90 For example, a tree needs to blossom 
in spring and dry out in fall. Th is transformation of the tree must be as such; or “the sovereign 
should be in a high position and the minister in a subordinate position,” this hierarchy must 
be as such.91 
Th is being so, we face a hermeneutical problem. Tality of being can be likened to both 
the natural part (“what makes a thing be what it is”) and the normative part (“what must be 
like this,” “what it should be”). But if we suppress the reference to being, pure suchness can be 
expressed at least by the fi rst part, by taking only the second translation given in brackets, i.e. 
“what makes a thing operate as it operates.” 92 In this expression, pure suchness is operation (sōsa 
操作) or operationality at work.93 Pure suchness shows itself when we suppress  the verb to be in 
the other expressions, i.e. the fact “that a tree blossoms at spring and dries out at the fall,” or that 
the sovereign stands higher than the minister. 94  We have already stressed the natural expression 
of this pure suchness in Laozi, the “as such” (ziran 自然),95 and Wang Bi’s logical expression: 
“the reason why everything stands as such (suoyiran)”96 
Maybe pure suchness can also be expressed in the second part, if we translate 所当然 as 
“what must stand like this” or “what it should stand for.” With Cheng Yi, we can understand 
suchness as also normative. Th e problem is whether suchness implies a reference to some 
normative reality, whose existence cannot then be completely excluded. Nishida’s expression 
for as such (sono mama ni そのままに) seems to be closer to the fi rst part, precisely because 
he considers that the ritual, moral and normative (tōi 当為) levels have to be transcended into 
some kind of creation in science, art, technique, and religion.97 He highlights such a creative 
suchness in Buddhism as the “natural spontaneity according to the law,” which consists in 
letting the productive nature of things reveal by itself (shi 自), in its factuality, as tality (zen 
然).98  How then might we grasp the thing really as such? And where might we grasp the thing 
when it is no more such as it is, perceived, acted, or produced, but where the as such refers to 
nothing  other than its own productive suchness? Th e answer is: only where the as such. . . 
is neither a being nor an essence nor a non being, but an eternal self-creating operation of 
producing (tsukuru 作る), and, thus, void, empty, emptying or suchness-less.
2. Synthesis and Unifi cation
From this point of view, notwithstanding the aforementioned infl uence of Chinese 
thought on the doctrine of unifi cation in Nishida, we might also underline a diff erence between 
synthesis and unifi cation.99 Ancient and modern Chinese thought seems to follow the maxim 
of Confucius: “I convey without creating anything new (述而不作).”100 
Of course, everyone who knows the remarkable discoveries and techniques of China 
will understand that this does not mean the absence of a whole history of progress,101 or a 
kind of sterility, as Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692) showed.102 Rather, “Chinese thought” 
ritually and medially creates itself by realizing a positive and original re actualization and re 
interpretation of a traditional cultural fund or stock, although, again, it is historically reductive 
or insuffi  cient to draw a straight line from Confucius to contemporary thinkers. Even in the 
case of contemporary thought, we can note that the very word for philosophy (哲学) was 
adopted in 1900 to mean both Western and ancient Chinese philosophies, especially by Liang 
Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) and Chang Chunmai 張君勱 (1887–1965).103 Th is off ers a 
striking contrast to the way the Japanese term tetsugaku was at that time reserved for Western 
philosophy. Such a semantic fusion seems to refl ect in history itself the centralizing power 
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dwelling in the very image of the middle (zhong 中).104 
Th us, it might be argued that Chinese thought is synthesizing itself gradually and seamlessly, 
either in a progressive or a conservative way.105 In history, we might refer to the holist vision of 
the world of the Han (202bc–220bc) in Huainanzi, Dong Zhongshu, Yang Xiong, recovering 
the lost unity of sky and man,106 the “great synthesis of Song of the south” (twelfth century, 
Zhu Xi 朱憙 [1130–1200] and Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 [1139–1192]), the “compilations” of 
the thirteenth century and several movements of “return” to the Han, and, indeed, modern 
thinkers such as Liu Fenglu 劉逢禄 (1776–1829), Fang Dongshu 方東樹 (1772–1851) and 
Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919).107 We might consider also the integration of Indian Buddhism 
into Chinese philosophy (1–11th centuries), especially in Neo Confucianism from the eleventh 
century,108 and the attempt to transpose Western thought in the twentieth century.109 Still, 
integration and transposition cannot completely escape from this impressive “labor [of Chinese 
consciousness] to radically rethink tradition,” this “care to reveal in the multiplicity of things 
a fundamental unity,” showing another kind of synthetic tendency.110 Eventually, we can 
distinguish in this trend at least two features. Firstly, it is grounded in practical learning, as 
J.-F. Billeter states about Zhuangzi: “Gesture is a synthesis.”111 In other words, a gesture can 
be explained as the synthesizing act that gives us the ability to master a traditional art, such as 
making a plough, and by extension to master the very art of thinking. Secondly, the trend is to 
be related to the synthesizing implications of one of the core metaphysical concepts of Chinese 
thought and culture, the middle. As the Korean philosopher Pak Tong-hwan explains: 
Th e second attitude toward the impact of incommensurability is an approach that 
attempts to juxtapose, compromise and synthesize constituent factors in confl ict. Th is 
attitude seems to be eff ective in seeking harmony. East Asians, the Chinese in particular, 
have valued highly the logic of “reversion” ([fan] 反 or return) and the “mean” ([zhong] 
中 or center). Such Chinese classics as the Yijing (Book of Changes), Daodejing (Book 
of the Way), and Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) alike hold that dao (or the Way) 
is the movement of reversion from the extreme of yin (陰 or negative), to the extreme 
of yang (陽 or positive), and it is, therefore, wise to maintain the position of the mean 
(or the center). According to this logic, the utmost wisdom lies in the timely mean and 
harmony that avoid taking sides with any of the extremes. Such wisdom may have been 
conceived from a concept that does not see the extremity or the periphery as a motive 
of further development.112
Th is is not to say that a tendency to return to traditional soil while reinterpreting foreign 
infl uences was not present in Japanese culture and philosophy. Ōshima Hitoshi 大島仁 refers to 
this as “mythical thinking.”113 Yet with Nishida, we fi nd a preoccupation to conceive of creation 
at the level of an infi nite unifi cation of Western, Chinese and Indian philosophies. Here lies the 
core of his famous 1940 essay Th e Problem of Japanese Culture. In history, Japanese culture is 
characterized by a receptive (juyōteki 受容的) attitude, expressing the logical nature of the place 
through poiesis. And this unifi cation cannot be confused with the result of a “great” political 
unifi cation, quested for in Chinese and Japanese cultural histories.114 Unifi cation (tōitsu 統一), 
for Nishida, is indeed a unity (ichi 一) placed in the ruling or mastering (tō 統) position, but 
in the sense of an endless postponement of a fi nal unity that can neither be nor not be since it 
is ever in the making. Th is creation of unity in Nishida clearly contrasts with the actualizing 
synthesis pursued by Chinese thought.
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3. Intuition in Action
Nishida’s logic of creative unifi cation within a vanishing place to reveal pure operative and 
creative suchness (less) is eventually expressed in the poiesistic paradigm of “intuition in action,” 
that is, action as the place for speculation. We intuit in acting; we see what we have created.115 
What precisely is his debt to Chinese thought from this perspective? To begin with, his own 
philosophical style, quickly becoming abstract or at least very unfamiliar, was infl uenced to a 
certain extent by a distance from science that was a mark, not only of Chinese thought but also 
of Japanese thought.116 Nishida comments: 
It is not possible to reduce Western culture to knowledge (gaku 学). But Eastern culture, 
especially Chinese culture, was doctrinal (kyō 教) and cannot be called a knowledge in 
the actual sense of the word. In no way do I despise doctrine [wisdom]. But I think 
that, whereas we can fi nd precious elements at the ground of Eastern culture that are 
not inferior and in fact surpass [those of ] Western culture, its weak point is not to have 
developed this knowledge.
I refer to metaphysical standpoint to mean how each culture considered the question of 
reality. It may be said, of course, that in China, and especially in Japan, the question of 
reality was not considered scientifi cally (gakumonteki ni 学問的に); it may even be said 
that metaphysics was not especially developed. But the fact that there was no distinctive 
science of metaphysics does not necessarily mean that there was no metaphysical thought. 
Inasmuch as a specifi c culture has developed, it can be conceived in metaphysical terms. 
Where there is a culture, there must be a view [conception] of life (jinseikan 人生観). 
At the root of a view of life must be included some kind of metaphysical thought, even 
though it is not consciously realized. 117
Passages such as this show the extent to which Nishida sought to read in the “laboratory” 
of ancient Chinese culture in order to think philosophically. However, as Japanese culture 
represents a part of Eastern culture, Nishida philosophy itself can be said to have kept close 
ties with a certain Chinese way of thinking. So, though Nishida criticized the ritual aspect of 
Chinese (Confucian) thought, and though he tried numerous ways to get closer to a scientifi c 
method, it might be objected that he himself fell into a form of ritual and doctrinal writing. 118
Furthermore, Nishida’s style generally shows a certain lack of interest in defi nitions, even 
though he tries to defi ne metaphysics in the above quotation.Th is constitutes a noteworthy trait 
of Chinese thought, too, which is open to the fl uidity of meaning and the free use of words, by 
contrast to the logical and rational ideal of Greek philosophy. 119 In Chinese thought, however, 
this kind of fl oating of semantic interest is grounded in the importance given to pragmatic and 
normative function. For instance, on a linguistic level, the leading interrogation is not “What 
is a word?” but rather “How must a word be lived and applied?”120 I have shown  the extent to 
which this functional aspect is present in Nishida’s writing style, for his vocabulary is not fi xed; 
it is rather in evolution and fi nally topologically distributed according to the diff erent “places” 
and positions of reality.121 In fact, Nishida’s relative lack of interest in defi nitions is directly 
grounded in the logic of the place, for which defi nitions can only take place in determinate 
being.
Now, in relation to the debt of Nishida’s practical philosophy to Chinese thought, 
we might call on Confucius for his famous critique of purely bookish learning. We might 
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remember as well  the critique of knowledge in the Zhuangzi. Th e famous cook Ting saw at 
fi rst the massive “whole ox in front of him.” After three years of training, he was seeing no more 
than “some parts of the ox.” Th en, reaching his perfect skill, he was just “fi nding the ox with 
his spirit, without seeing it with his eyes.” Th is spirit (神) is “the perfect integrated activity of 
the actor,” or more precisely, his most incorporated activity, where even spirit disappears as a 
source of error and defeats, and the body becomes “the totality of capabilities, resources, and 
strengths, known or unknown to us, carrying our activity.”122 Th us, knowledge is not conceived 
as prospecting what can I know (Kant’s fi rst question), but rather showing how we [rightly] 
know, and how does knowledge rightly fall (dang 当).123 Th e socio-ethical level of the how is 
prior to the scientifi c level of the why. Cheng explains:
Rather than “to know what” (i.e. a propositional knowledge that would aim at truth as 
its ideal content), knowledge—understood as what, still not being an action, tends to 
action—is above all “to know how:” how to make distinctions in order to direct one’s 
life and wittingly arrange the social and cosmic space.124
Of course, to know how represents in Confucius an emptying of the epistemological 
perspective: not to possess knowledge, but to feel oneself as a void, so as to try to go to the bot-
tom of the question.125 But this void, as we saw, is eff ectively practical, not topological. 126 Hence, 
Nishida considers that in Plato, philosophy and politics were unifying according to “pure in-
tellectuality and logic,” while in Confucius, this unifying activity was rather coming from a 
kind of practical intellection.127 We might in this sense understand Nishida’s proposition that 
Chinese culture was (relatively) “poor in pure intellectuality and logic,”128 even if it is true that 
it might also echo a commonplace in the judgment of some Japanese thinkers about China.129 
Chinese thought for Nishida was noetically active at the level of action (knowledge in action), 
and not absolutely poor in intellectuality and logic. 130 Nishida rejects both an excess of logic 
and an absolute lack of logic, as exhibited in the vain ideological and nationalistic unity of 
politics and philosophy in times of in war time Japan that he seemed to criticize. 131 He writes: 
Since Confucius in the East and Plato in the West, philosophy has not been separated 
from politics. However, when a philosophy idly subordinates itself to a certain politics, 
it cannot escape becoming a perverted and fl attering science. Politics without ideas is 
not the true politics. Ideology must include ideas.132
Th e expression Nishida used to condemn the contaminated offi  cial philosophy, namely 
“a perverted and fl attering science” kyokugaku asei 曲学阿世, actually comes from a Chinese 
classic, the Historical annals 史記 of Sima Qian (司馬遷). So twice, with Confucius and with 
Sima, he takes the authority of ancient Chinese thought to criticize the modern contamination 
of politics and philosophy. Nevertheless, Nishida reverses the hierarchy of the why and the 
how.133 Th e level of the how is characterized as an explanatory scientifi c level that cannot reach 
the philosophical level of understanding expressed by the why. Obviously, up to a point, the 
essence of practical knowledge lies in the idea of knowing how. P. Ricoeur puts it this way: 
“How do you know that you are doing what you are doing? Th e answer is: ‘You know it by 
doing it . . .  Knowledge of the gesture is in the gesture’.”134 
However, Ricoeur’s intention is to criticize here the disappearing of the self as ipse-ity 
(“an agentless semantics of action”) from within an event (in the sense of E. Anscombe): Whose 
gesture is it?135 And from Nishida’s position, we might ask: What is this “in” in the expression: 
“in the gesture”? Is it spatial according to an analogy with spatial space, or according to a 
154 Michel Dalissier
phenomenology of action, or should we conceive another kind of practical spatiality? In order 
to know how, we need a deeper knowledge of the very what of this place of knowing how itself. 
In this sense, the place reveals the why. Intuition in action does not mean only intuition while 
acting, but intuition within the very fact of acting. It is topological. It is not concerned by the 
closure eff ect of the action, that is how the action will end practically.136 It is concerned rather 
with the infi nitely emptying place of actualization of the action, that is why actions can start, 
spring, jump, and—in other words—act.137
Conclusion
To sum up, Nishida’s intellectual path can be compared to a kind of self-liberation from 
the domination of Chinese thought that remains half achieved. Th is point is quite perceptible 
at the level of what we might call a shift to Buddhist thought. Nishida prefers to the Chinese 
ritual conception of nature as a unity of sky and man (tenjin gōitsu 天人合一), the idea of 
unifi cation (tōitsu) with facts coming from a topological “negation of man inside man.” 
In Buddhist terms, this unifi cation has been expressed in the following propositions: 
Tenshan (徳山 782–865)’s “within mind without facts; within facts without mind”; Shinran’s 
“natural spontaneity according to the law” (shizen 自然), and Dōgen’s “relinquishment of 
body and mind” and self-negation.138 Might Nishida have forgotten in 1940 the Chinese 
conception of ziran, present in Zhuangzi, Laozi and Wang Bi that he had stressed in 1933? His 
later interest in classical Chinese culture seems rather polarized on Chan Buddhism with its 
historical evolution as Zen in Japan. He quotes Confucius to explain the Buddhist notion of the 
root of the ordinary (byōjōtei 平常底).139 Notwithstanding the fact that such a shift is partially 
related to historical, cultural and ideological means, is it still possible to provide a philosophical 
explanation for it? My hypothesis is that the sharp distinction between Western ontology and 
the Eastern theory of nothingness can be deepened through the diff erentiation of non being 
and absolute nothingness.140 It might then be argued here within the frame of the construction 
of a kind of unifi cation of world philosophies that, fi rstly, Nishida strove to extract mainly the 
essence of Western philosophy from the position of being (ontology)—even if that does not 
exclude Neo Platonist and medieval speculations about non being. Second, Nishida’s position 
on Chinese philosophy is above all that of the duality present within the frame of a reciprocal 
correlation between a kind of being (you), and a kind of non being (wu) (meontology). But 
thirdly, these very distinctions and positions are only conceivable by taking, in principle, the 
endlessly unfolding position of the logic of absolute nothingness (neontology).141 
Nishida proposes that Western cultures (Greek, Roman, Semitic, Christian, modern Eu-
ropean science) mainly “take being as the foundation of reality,” or “what possesses a form” (that 
is, yūkei 有形, eidos, Law, Absolute transcendent God, Personal God, objective thing) or that 
which is a determinate thing (gentei serareta mono 限定せられたもの). By contrast, Eastern 
cultures “take non being as the foundation of reality,” or “what is without form” (mukei 無
形). In China, “the thought of non being” is practical; it is “the negation of practice through 
practice” (gyō o motte gyō o hitei 行を以て行を否定), a moral “negation of morality,” accord-
ing to a spatial, three?dimensional ritual practice. In India, the “thought of non being” is “the 
deepest” (mottomo fukai 最も深い); it is an act of intellectual negation, namely  “the negation 
of knowledge by knowledge” (chi o motte chi o hitei 知を以て知を否定), conceived as “deep 
contemplation within the self and infi nite compassion towards the external word” (uchi ni wa 
fukaki meisō to nari, soto ni wa mugen no jihi 内には深き瞑想となり、外には無限の慈
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悲), or the endless world of samsâra of non permanence through time. 
For Nishida actual reality itself is “both being and non being; being equals non being, and 
non being equals being” (yū ni shite mu naru mono de aru 有にして無なるものである、yū 
soku mu, mu soku yū  有即無、無即有). In other words, actual reality represents a “unity” 
in the making, in which all aspects (subjective and objective, noematic and noetic) absolutely 
unite each other in a dialectical self-determining actual reality. Nishida from this metaphysical 
standpoint insists that “various cultural forms crystallize,” based on a “transcendent, non-actual 
world” in Christian affi  rmation or Buddhism negation, or in the “immanent, actual world” in 
Greek intellectual aesthetics, or in Chinese moral practice or in the emotional grasp of the pas-
sage of time, as in Japanese mono no aware, tanka and haiku.142
In his logic of place, Nishida does not proceed from determinate being (things) to opposi-
tional nothingness (actions), and then to absolute nothingness (operation) through negation, as 
in the Hegelian logical process. He reverses the order: while standing in absolute nothingness, 
“we see things through action;” we do not follow a “process of time” but plunge into the empty 
“depth of time” (jikan no soko 時間の底). Nishida conceives of neither Japanese nor Buddhist 
culture as absolute. All culture for him possesses the dialectic nature of reality under certain 
aspects: “historical reality is both spatial and temporal; both objective and subjective; both 
being and nothingness. Needless to say, every culture emerging in history as a concrete reality 
includes these diff erent aspects. Th e more concrete it is, the more this is so.”143 In Nietzsche’s 
terms, Greek culture is mainly Apollonian and centered on being, space, even as it contains 
some Dionysian elements, such as non being, time, pessimism. Christian culture is mainly 
ontological with God as an absolute person, “the most determinate” person with “free will” (in 
the words of Th omas Aquinas), but not entirely lacking a “thought of nothingness” with God as 
“Deus absconditus,” and negative theology such as in Dionysius the Aeropagite. Indian culture 
is pantheism (banyū shinkyō 万有神教) and a “negation of all beings” (banyū  o mo hitei?万有を
も否定). Modern scientifi c culture is mainly ontological, but hides some meontological aspects 
such as the negation of actuality as idea, person, and subjectivity. 144 We can interpret Nishida’s 
ontological characterizations represented by “is” in the above quotations as refl ecting the very 
crystallization of cultural forms from within the noematic depth of absolute nothingness, so 
giving the world its pluricultural colors. 
Further arguments of Nishida’s seem to confi rm this topological description. For example, 
the “occidental idea of nature” is an abstract concept affi  rmed by the subject conceiving nature 
as an existing material, in particular in science. “Nature in Chinese culture, the union of sky 
and man” comes to represent rather a “humanized nature” seen from the “central” position of 
man, a wisdom of nature grounded in the reciprocation of being and non being.145 And the 
“natural spontaneity according to the law” refers in Shinran to the topological negation of men 
as the very place of a nature recovering its natural spontaneity, and of the absolute force of the 
other (tariki 他力) in Amida’s vow.146
Moreover, Western thought searches for reality in the direction of the noema, namely  the 
ontologized object of knowledge: eidos in Greek philosophy or the physical world in modern 
European science. Th e place of determined being is the location for objectivity. By contrast, 
Eastern practice searches for reality in the direction of the noesis, namely the act of knowledge: 
intellectual introspection and compassion in Indian religion, ritual in Chinese practice. Th e 
place of oppositional nothingness is the fi eld of action. And Nishida philosophy represents an 
attempt to search for reality in the dialectical unity of the two directions, neither condemning 
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nor rejecting either of them. Absolute nothingness is the place wherein we see objects (noema) 
through action (noesis).147 Of course, Nishida’s quite schematic explanation requires more proofs 
and exposition.148 However, it does not accord to Chinese philosophy an inferior position, as 
was the case throughout Japanese intellectual history, for example in Confucianist thinkers such 
as Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685), or kokugaku 国学 masters such as Motoori Norinaga 
本居宣長 (1730–1801) or Hirata Atsutane 平田篤胤 (1776–1843).149 It accords to Chinese 
philosophy rather the position of a defi nitely special character (tokushoku) within the frame of 
a metaphysical system aiming at a topologization of world philosophies.150 Nishida, who wrote 
his metaphysical analysis of ancient Chinese culture four years before the Nanking massacre of 
1937, was indeed against this war. He responded that it would be desirable for Prime Minister 
Konoe at least to “demonstrate his determination, and tell the world that the government will 
not take an aggressive, narrow-minded course.”151
Now, in what sense should we take this metaphysical specifi city of Chinese thought? We 
are allowed to interpret this genuine position as an intermediary and at the same time a supreme 
position.152 In Nishida’s terms, this simultaneity refers to the word soku 即.153 Here, there is a 
striking characterization by Wang Fuzhi who speaks of a “dynamic tension between opposite 
forces . . . powerful creative tensions that some call the Dao,” giving us the “wisdom” constantly 
to “fi nd perfect equilibrium in all situations.” So this position is in no way unproductive or 
uncreative.154 In this perspective, we might recall the words of Pak Tong-hwan quoted above, 
and refer to what Nishida himself eventually called “Chinese philosophy” (chūgoku tetsugaku 中
国哲学) as the philosophy par excellence of the middle (chū?中).155 For he saw it as a genuine 
and unique meditation on mutation and cyclical interchange between “complementary 
opposites” (“yin/yang, sky/earth, void/full, father/son”156), “the notional couples of traditional 
thought” irreducible to “being or the reality of the absolute.”157 A. Cheng emphasizes this point:
Perceived as two aspects of a unique and same reality [plunged] into a permanent 
coming-and-going movement, [the virtual and the manifest] are not generators of 
“disjunctive concepts” such as being/nothingness, spirit/body, God/world, subject/
object, reality/appearance, good/evil, etc. Th e Chinese, having this concern of avoiding 
the risk inherent in dualism of coagulating the circulation of the vital breath into a 
face-to-face dead end, preferred to put forward the polarity of the Yin and the Yang that 
preserves the alternative current of life and the correlative character of all organic reality: 
coexistence, coherency, correlation and complementarity. . . . Aspiration for a return to 
a lost unity can be found in other cultures, but what is specifi c to Chinese thought is 
the continuity provided by the constant coming and going between there-is-not and 
there-is, invisible and visible.158
If we try to interpret this description in terms of Nishida’s topologization, we need to 
remember that the place of oppositional nothingness shows itself in at least two complementary 
layers, reciprocal interaction and infi nite transition.159 Such a complementarity is expressed 
under a myriad forms in German philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Cohen, Lotze, Husserl), 
within the context of Western philosophy which seems always to consider being as the alpha 
and omega of reality. But in the range of a world philosophy, these layers might correspond to 
the eff ective “interaction and reciprocal becoming” of the complementary opposites of Chinese 
thought. 160 In the Yijing 易経, the essence of the mutations is not a quasi magical gradual 
transformation (化) without shock, but a change (変) as “the principle of interchange of Yin-
Yang or conversion of one into the other,”161 expressed in the endlessly moving and changing 
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nature of water.162
Moreover, we have to consider here an empty place of mediation, the “middle”?(?), the 
“void” (xu), as the source of the tension between mutations that generates the “organic relation, 
living and creative, that constitutes” these opposites, and attracts man towards the Good. 163
We are far from the cautious care to keep a “right middle” between two extremes or from 
a chilly compromise that would satisfy itself with a “middle term”. . . Th e middle is not 
an equidistant point between two terms, but rather this pole whose attraction draws 
us higher, creating and maintaining in all life situations a tension that makes us aspire 
always more to the best part of what is born between us.164
In other words, this middle is man as the medium, which is expressed by the fi rst and 
second component of the character 仁 in Chinese, becoming two separate characters in Japanese: 
ningen 人間. 165  Since Confucius, these terms have expressed the idea of a priority of the duality 
(二) over the unity, of in betweenness (間) over individuals in human relations in families, 
communities, societies, states, and universe, which is a pivotal conception for contemporary 
Japanese philosophy.166 Th e characters themselves are not fundamental notions to combine, 
but a network of signifi cations born from stylized gestures according to a ritual value.167 Th is is 
better understood as a sentimental, political, and social space of distinctions (別),168 distribution 
(分), as in the Xunzi 荀子,169 rather than as a space of assimilation (兼), standardization or 
levelling according to rational and equitable judgments, such as in the arguments of Mozi. 
Nishida quotes Xunzi precisely to defi ne the nature of Chinese thought directed at moral 
improvement through rituals.170 Moreover, as he himself remarked, in Confucianism this space 
refers to the kind of ritual negativity of individuality present in benevolence.171 To this we can 
add gentleness172 and sacrifi ce173 as well as compassion: I am human because I cannot but help 
the other in pain or in danger; there is no reason for this moral conduct.174 
From Nishida’s position, such an opened, rich, and deep inter subjective space can be 
likened to the “place of an oppositional nothingness,” even if the reason for such an aperture 
needs to be probed. Apart from the primary importance of the void (oblivion, change, 
forgiveness) for a subjectivity defi ned as “the coming and going between void and things” 
(Zhuangzi),175 we might suggest that Nishida, stressed also the plane of this coming and going 
movement as residing in a place of a deeper nothingness, a kind of void before the void.176 In 
other words, if according to Nishida, “to be is to stand within,”177 that is, if being is in absolute 
nothingness, then inter relations between beings must also stand in this unfathomable place.
To put it in a nutshell, Western philosophy scientifi cally explores the wonders, soundness, 
and hegemonies of a real and objective being, within which void still does not really exist.178 
Chinese philosophy describes the functional179 interactions between the “thousand beings,” 
and the “void” as the place of “mutations,”180 concentrating on ritual and organic circulations 
of all kind. And Nishida probes the depths of reality as an operation of self-evacuation, giving 
“Japanese philosophy” the mark of a special concern for the unifi cation of cultures. But no 
philosophy is superior to the other.  It is rather a question of domain, behaviour, competence, 
specialization, depth—in a word, a question of place.
158 Michel Dalissier
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NOTES
1　 Th is study is the second part of a critical survey of the relations between Nishida Kitarō and Chi-
nese philosophy. Th e philosophical conceptual framework of the present essay is based on the defi ni-
tions, warnings and explanations given in the fi rst part, “Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy” in 
Cheung and Lam, ed. Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 4. Th e reader is strongly advised to consult that 
essay fi rst. I wish to make three preliminary points with regard to Part 2. Firstly, I rely mainly on the 
History of Chinese Th ought by Anne Cheng for references, in particular those concerning Laozi and 
Zhuangzi. Secondly, my aim is by no means to justify the fact of Kyoto School philosophers commit-
ment with nationalism. Th irdly, I do not contest the evidence that the main intellectual infl uences on 
Nishida’s thought are Western philosophy (see Dalissier, 2009a) and Japanese Buddhism. What follows 
is an attempt to provide additional material for the ongoing debates on Nishida.
2　 Nishida 1937, in NKZ 2002–2009, vol. 7, p. 339.
3　 Nishida 1937, in NKZ 2002–2009, vol. 7, p. 339. Nishida 1935, in NKZ 2002–2009, vol. 11, 
p. 283.
4　 Cheung 2009, pp. 156–75.
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5　 See Dalissier 2009b, pp. 224 ff ., 237, for an explanation of the use of these terms, borrowed from 
Occidental philosophy.
6　 Vandermeersch 1977, 1980, vol. 2, pp. 512–513, quoted in Cheng 1997, pp. 103–104. Th e fol-
lowing English translations of quotations from this work are my own.
7　 Cheng 1997, p. 194. Emphasis added.
8　 Ibid., pp. 194–95. Laozi, § 10, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 201.
9　 Ibid., p. 305.
10　Ibid., p. 311. Emphasis added. See also pp. 41, 274.
11　Laozi 28 and 40, Cheng 1997, pp. 442–43. 
12　Laozi, § 11, quoted in Cheng 1997, pp. 194–95.
13　Ibid., p. 195.
14　Th is  term refers to a unifying, creative, corporeal operation. See Dalissier, 2009a, p. 102. On 
“intuition in action,” see Dalissier 2008b, pp. 21–51.
15　Cheng 1997, p. 255.
16　Ibid., p. 195.
17　「皆知美之為美　斯悪已　皆知善之為善　斯不善已　故有無相生」Laozi, § 2, quoted 
in Cheng 1997, p. 195. See also the translation by Izutsu: “All under heaven recognize beauty as 
beauty, and then arises ugliness. All under heaven recognize good as good, and there arises evil. In fact, 
being and non being give birth to each other.” (Izutsu, 2001, p. 30)
18　Mu ni torawarete iru, mu no katachi ni toraerarete iru mono de aru. Sono genzai wa ugoku gen-
zai de wa nai. Tada mugen no genzai de aru. 無に囚らはれて居る、無の形に囚へられて居るも
のである。その現在は動く現在ではない、唯無限の現在である」in Nishida 1933, p. 450. 
Translated by David A. Dilworth as “Th e Forms of Culture of the Classical Period of East and West 
Seen from a Metaphysical Perspective,” (Nishida 1970), p. 252. I will frequently modify the English 
translations. 
19　See Dalissier 2009a, pp. 292, 399–403, 423 ff . Th e same point is expressed, in a slightly diff er-
ent way, in Nishida’s idea that Chinese culture “lacked that spirit that searches endlessly for the truth” 
and “became solidifi ed and fi xed” (NKZ 1987, vol. 12, p. 280) itself. Nishida does not suggest that it 
stopped developing, but rather that it ritually searched for the truth, renewing itself within the scope 
of its own tradition.
20　For precise references, see Dalissier, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c. In Nishida 1970, p. 245 (1933, 
p. 440), Nishida refers to “Russian culture” as a “culture of nothingness,” arguing as follows: “A culture 
of negation of the logos; in its inner depths there is a dark intensity (kurai shinkoku?暗い深刻), such 
as seen in the novels of Dostoevsky. In such a sense, it has qualities which are even more opposed to 
Greek culture than other cultures. Even in present day Russian Marxism, there is such a special qual-
ity (tokushoku 特色) despite its profession of scientism.” Th is is an intuition that one of his disciples, 
Nishitani Keiji, would develop in his work, Th e Self-Overcoming of Nihilism. See Nishitani 1990.
21　Rittaiteki soshiki 立体的組織, Nishida 1970, pp. 237–48. (Nishida 1933, pp. 440–44).
22　See my treatment of Nishida and space in Dalissier 2008a. Nishida’s theory of unity without form 
is based on the distinction between  the two abyssal dimensions of “retreat” (no form) and “dissemina-
tion” (formation). Th e “spatiality” is symbolically expressed as a “plane” (heimen 平面), NKZ 1987, 
vol. 7, p. 445. On the metaphysical geometry of “planes” and “solids” in Nishida, see Dalissier 2009a, 
pp. 262, 282–88, and Appendix pp. 134–169 (Appendix to Dalissier 2009a can be found on-line at: 
http://www.droz.org/siteDroz/rubrique.php?ID=1002339).
23　Dalissier 2009a, pp. 180–181. Nishitani Keiji was to place particular emphasis on the idea of 
vacuity as a “blue sky.” See, for instance, Van Bragt 1982, pp. 1–45.
24　Cheng 1997, p. 311. Emphasis added.
25　Kū suru koto 空うすること, Dalissier 2009, p. 526 ff ..
26　Cheng 1997, pp. 377, 451.
27　Cheng 1997, p. 451.
28　「気本之虚則湛〔一〕無形，感而生則聚而有象」Zhang Zai, Zhengmeng, 1, Zhangzai ji, 
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10, Cheng 1997, p. 451.
29　「天地之道無非以至虚為実. . . 金鉄有時而腐，山岳有時而摧，凡有形之物即易壊，
惟太虚無動揺，故為至実」Zhang Zai, Zhangzi yulu, Zhangzai ji, 325, Cheng 1997, p. 451.
30　Zhengmeng, 1, in Zhangzai ji, 7–8, Cheng 1997, pp. 453–54.
31　Zhengmeng, 2, 6, in Zhangzai ji, 10, 22, Cheng 1997, pp. 453–54.
32　Cheng 1997, pp. 451–52.
33　「循是出入，是皆不能已而然也. . .太虚為清，清則無礙，無礙故神; 反清為濁，濁則
礙，礙則形」Zhengmeng, 1, in Zhangzai ji, 7–9, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 452.
34　Nengyiyouwu 能一有無 (Yishuo 易説), Zhangzai ji, p. 207, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 453.
35　Zettaimujunteki jiko dōitsu  絶対矛盾的自己同一, Dalissier 2005,  p. 1372.
36　Th e expression refers to the original sense of the “natural order” (li 理). Cheng 1997, pp. 57, 595. 
Th is central image of Chinese thought returns in thinkers such as Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200) and Lu 
Xiangshan 陸像山 (1139–1193), Cheng 1997, pp. 479, 511. See the analysis by Nishi Amane 西周 
(1829–1897), in Saito 2006, p. 6.
37　Vandermeersch 1977, 1980, vol. 2, p. 285, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 57.
38　Cheng 1997, pp. 57, 88. Granet 1934, pp. 15, 36. See, however, the notes of Heiner Roetz con-
cerning this delicate question in Cheng 2005, pp. 53–57.
39　Granet 1934, pp. 45–46.
40　Ibid., p. 29.
41　Nishida 1970, pp. 240–44 (1933, pp. 434–38).
42　Dalissier 2009a, Appendix, pp. 117, 126, 370, 380.
43　Nishida 1939b, p. 320. Such a philosophy of history contrasts with Lévinas’s ontological appre-
hension of historical science in relation to the problem of the other. See for instance Lévinas 1971, pp. 
48, 198, 252–253, 276, 283, 329.
44　On the greatness of Confucianism, see NKZ 1987, vol. 12, pp. 344–45. Nihon bunka no mondai 
日本文化の問題 (Th e problem of Japanese Culture, 1940). On the “ritual-social” aspect, especially 
in the Six Classics (jing 経), the Book of rites (Liji 礼記), the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春
秋), the Book of History (Shujing 書経), the Book of Songs (Shijing 詩経), see Nishida 1970, pp. 240–43 
(434–37). Nishida owned numerous editions of these works, see Yamashita 1982, no. 78, 218–219, 
221–228 (p. 188), 196, 443 (p. 310), 751, 756, 760, 767 (p. 323), 953 (p. 334). He made reference to 
the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Changes and the Four Books, until at least 1944, one year before 
his death. An old edition of the Spring and Autumn Annals in his possession is annotated in detail; 
see Yamashita 1982, no. 225 (p. 196). He also quotes the Commentary of Zuo (Zuo zhuan 左伝), the 
Analects (Lun yu 論語), the Mean (Zhong yong 中庸), Zhuangzi 莊子, Laozi 老子 and Xunzi 荀子; 
Nishida 1970, pp. 240–51 (1933, 434–49).
45　「古者聖王以，人之性悪以為偏険而不正，悖乱而不治，是以為之起礼義制法度，
以矯飾人之情性而正之，以擾化人之情性」Xunzi, chapter 23, in Nishida’s own edition, Xunzi 
1912, vol. 23, p. 288. Th is book is referenced under no. 78 in Yamashita 1982, p. 188. It is diffi  cult 
not to notice the underlining in red ink of some signifi cant words  in the fi rst chapter of the Xunziji-
anyi 荀子箋訳 (Commentary on Xunzi) (Yamashita 1982, no. 236, p.197), a book that cannot have 
belonged to any ancestor of Nishida, given the edition date of 1885. We have thus a right to believe 
this copy and the annotations were Nishida’s. Th e underlined words are “吾嘗跂而望矣.不如登高
之愽見也,” vol. I, p.1: “I once stood on my tiptoes to look out into the distance, but it was not so 
eff ective as climbing up to a high place for a broader vista.” (Knoblock 1988, vol. 1, p. 136). Emphasis 
added. Th ese very words, and the rest of this passage (“Climbing to a height and waving your arm does 
not cause the arms’ length to increase, but your wave can be seen farther away. Shouting downwind 
does not increase the tenseness of the sound, but it is heard more distinctly”) might indeed be used to 
express the essence of the “logic of place” in Nishida: not to stand in “action” from within a determined 
“point of view” (tachiba) but to reach a higher “unfolding” place, thanks to the coordinated work of 
the perceptiveness of “intuition” and the climbing power of “refl ection.” See Dalissier 2009a, pp. 149, 
423 ff . Some other sentences are also underlined in red, and these I render here into italics: “Th ere 
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must be some beginning for every type of phenomenon that occurs. Th e coming of honor or disgrace must 
be a refl ection on one’s inner power. From rotting meat come maggots; decaying wood produce wood-
worms. . . If you accumulate enough earth to build up a high hill, rain and wind will fl ourish because 
of it. If you accumulate enough water to fi ll a chasm, dragons and scaly dragons will be born within it. 
If you accumulate enough good to make whole your inner power, a divine clarity of intelligence will 
be naturally acquired and a sage-like mind will be fully realized. Accordingly, if you accumulate paces 
and double paces, you will lack the means to reach a thousand li; and if you do not accumulate small 
streams, you will have no way to fi ll a river or sea” (vol. 2, pp. 137–38) All these words can be said to 
coincide with Nishida’s topological account of “fi lling,” “emptying,” and “condensation.” See my treat-
ment in Dalissier 2009a, p. 464 ff .
46　Nishida 1970, pp. 240–44 (434–38). Nishida 1940, pp. 279, 339. Emphasis added. But at the 
same time, we need to remember the very rituality of Japanese culture itself. 
47　Nishida 1970, p. 247 (442). Hegel 1940, p. 270. Emphasis added.
48　「礼必本就天」Li Yun (礼運) section of the Book of the Rites, quoted by Nishida in Nishida 
1970, p. 241 (435). See Nishida’s own copy (Heian Shoko, 1891), Yamashita 1982, 219/196.
49　Ten wa seiō no hakaru tokoro de atta?天は聖王の則る所であった, Nishida 1970, p. 241 (435).
50  Nishida 1970, p. 253 (451–52).
51　Nishida 1940, pp. 346–47, 360.
52　On the ritual dimension of the Ritsu sect, see Hase 2005, pp. 7–18 and Hérail 1986, pp. 93–94. 
For the transformation of the Shingon sect, see Nishida 1970, p. 253 (451). Emphasis added.
53　Cheng 1997, pp. 409, 413.
54　Nishida 1940, pp. 356–57. Historically, Chan maintained itself through the Five Schools of the 
Five Dynasties (907–960) and the three schools of the Song dynasty (969–1279): caodong/Sōtō 曹
洞, linji/Rinzai?臨済, yunmen /Unmon 雲門. See Nakimovitch 1999, pp. 70–71 and Nishida 1970, 
p. 243 (437).
55　Nishida 1940, pp. 307, 360, 365–366. “Zen, which taught that ‘the willows are green and the 
fl owers are red,’ fused with the spirit of the warrior in Japan during the Kamakura period, and thus it, 
too, was a great infl uence on Japanese culture. We may even say that Zen has deeply permeated Japa-
nese life,” Nishida 1970, p. 253 (451).
56　Th e concepts of noema and noesis in Nishida diff er radically from their expressions in Hus-
serlian phenomenology. Roughly speaking, noesis represents the endless self emptying and retreating 
operation of nothingness as an ungrounded medium. Noema stands for the crystallized, formalized, 
ontologized negative trace testifying to such a retreat of nothingness. Th e noema is manifestation of 
being, of something to see, think, act, or remember from within this place of absolute nothingness. See 
Dalissier 2009, pp. 203, 411–418. 
57　 Doko made mo is an expression Nishida endlessly repeats. Its meaning is essential to a realization 
of the eff ort he took to understand things as such, from the infi nite perspective of a never grounded 
creative nothingness. See Dalissier 2009a, p. 461.
58　 NKZ 1987, vol. 12, p. 280. In 1942, he added: “I think that a real eff ective spirit works at the 
root of Japanese culture. It must develop itself towards a scientifi c spirit really knowing no hindrance;” 
“artistic creation as an act of historical production.” NKZ 1987, vol. 10, p. 264.
59　 See Gordon 2003, pp. 188–192 and the Conclusion below.
60　 Nishida 1970, p. 254 (452–53). See Dalissier 2009a, p. 22 ff .
61　 Nishida 1970, p. 248 (444).
62　 Nishida 1970, pp. 249–50 (445–47). Emphasis added. 
63　 “Th e object of feeling cannot be intellectually determined. It cannot be frozen spatially (kūkanteki 
ni kotei serareta mono de wa nai 空間的に固定せられたものではない); for it is infi nite move-
ment.” Nishida 1970, p. 252 (450).
64　 Yusa 2002, p. 260. Yusa quotes Nishida 1970, p. 254 (448–49). 
65　 Nishida 1970, p. 254 (452–53). Emphasis added.
66　 No de wa nakarō ka のではなかろうか (translated here as “might we not think... ?”)? is an 
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expression that Nishida very seldom uses. On Nishida’s style, see Dalissier 2009a, pp. 18, 143, 328, 
363–71, 413.
67　 Dalissier 2009a, pp. 41, 127, 405, 510–14, 554.
68　 Ibid., p. 402.
69　 Soko ni そこに. Th is is an example of the method of topologic argumentation noted previously.
70　 Nishida 1970, p. 250 (447). Emphasis added. Th e importance of the notion of practice is stressed 
in particular in Confucius, Analects, VII, 24, XII, 3, XIV, 38 and XV, 25.
71　 See Yamagata 2007, p. 13.
72　 Or “compaction,” “condensation.” Cheng 1997, pp. 39–40, 206, 298, 502, 577, 581.
73　 See J.-F. Billeter and his analysis of the formula: “Treat things as things without letting yourself 
be treated as things by things” (物物而不物就物), Billeter 2004, pp. 108–109.
74　 Cheng 1997, pp. 39–40.
75　 He mentioned Laozi and Zhuangzi, and quoted Laozi, Nishida 1970, p. 242 (435).
76　 Cheng 1997, p. 121. Emphasis added.
77　是非吾所謂情也.吾所謂無情,言人之不以好悪内傷其身,常因自然,而不益生也
Zhuangzi 5, Shinshaku kanbun taikei 1979, VII, 243, quoted in Cheng 1997, p.134. For Nishida, 
“nature” in Chinese culture was “the order by which the sun, moon, and stars move [around man and 
the Earth]日月星辰に由って運行,” Nishida 1970, p. 243 (437).
78　 Cheng 1997, p. 124. 
79　 Ibid., p.138. Emphasis added. See pp. 130–131.
80　 Zhuangzi, 18, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 138.
81　 Cheng 1997, p. 149.
82　 Ibid., p. 149.
83　 Dalissier, 2006, pp. 112–42.
84　 Zhuangzi, 5, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 134.
85　 Zhuangzi, 2, 7, 33, Shinshaku kanbun taikei 1979, VII, 185–186, 290, quoted in Cheng 1997, 
pp. 130–31. See also pp. 354, 386, 440.
86　 Dalissier 2006, pp. 115–24, 137–39.
87　 Zhuangzi, 2, quoted in Cheng 1997, pp.131–32.
88　 Cheng 1997, p. 138. Dalissier 2009a, pp. 145, 394–95, 472.
89　 See Dalissier 2009a, p. 395, Appendix, p. 318.
90　 Ibid., p. 477.
91　 Ibid., pp. 476–77, 484, 582. Emphasis added.
92　 See Dalissier 2007b, pp. 19–42, in particular pp. 20, 25–26, 29, and Dalissier 2009a, pp. 395–
396.
93　 See Nishida’s essay on topological operationalism, Nishida 1939a.
94　 See Dalissier, 2007b, pp. 19–20.
95　 Laozi, 25, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 336.
96　 Wang Bi, quoted in Cheng 1997, p. 336.
97　 Dalissier 2009a, pp. 266, 371, 518.
98　 Nishida 1940, pp. 370–71. Nakagawa underlines this aspect in Nishida and in Japanese culture, 
Nakagawa 2005, pp. 29–36.
99　 I have shown the sense in which Nishida’s notion of unifi cation diverges from the Kantian syn-
thesis in Dalissier 2009a, p. 190.
100　 Analects, VII, 1, Legge: “A transmitter and not a maker.” See also Analects, II, 11, VII, 20.
101　 Enlightenment thinkers saw this ahistoricity as the very state of “natural reason, unadulterated 
by time and without revealed religion.” See Roetz in Cheng 2005, pp. 49–50.
102　 Cheng 1997, p. 581.
103　 Blocker and Starling 2001, pp. 3–5.
104　 Analects, VII, 1, Cheng 1997, pp. 31–35, 76, 84, 581. Anne Cheng thus asks: “Is it not at all 
times a Chinese priority to start by itself, to fi nd truth in itself?” Cheng 1997, p. 411. One might refer 
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here to the “spontaneity” (自) present in the meaning of 自然. Yet this priority is not to be conceived 
of at the level of the individual, but rather at the level of the interrelations between individuals and 
the world.
105　 Lee 2004, p. 18.
106　 Cheng 1997, p. 300.
107　 Ibid., pp. 293–294, 495–499, 588–591, 610–611, 618, 632.
108　 Ibid., p. 393 ff , pp. 431, 433.
109　 Th is tendency can be said to be more or less present in Mou Zhongsan, Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, 
Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming, Ma Yifu, Ge Zhaoguang, Fu Sinian, Liu Shipei, Chen Fuchen, Xie Wul-
iang, Wang Guowei, He Lin, and then Marxism. See Cheng 1997, pp. 641–645, and Cheng 2005, pp. 
8–9, Defoort 2005, pp. 69–71, Th oraval 2005, pp. 94–95 and especially Zheng 2005, pp. 124–132, 
137.
110　 Cheng 1997, pp. 431, 433
111　 Billeter 2004, pp. 23–24.
112　 See Pak 2004, pp. 31–32. 
113　 Blocker and Starling 2001, pp. 28, 34, 71–75. See Oshima 1989. 
114　 Nishida 1940, p. 359. An example is  the “great unifi cation” (dayitong 大一統), a unity (一) 
which represents a political unifying power (統) celebrated by an imperial cult during the Han. Th is 
speaks of the “unity of sky and men that closed itself before Chinese thought, too hurried to underlie 
political unifi cation with ideological harmonization, was able to engage in a real scientifi c approach. 
Cheng 1997, pp. 301–303, 311, 499. As Ueda Shizuteru explains, Nishida seems to have condemned 
the idea of hegemonic unity in war, colonization, or imperialism. See Dalissier 2009a, p. 22 ff . On this 
topic, see also Arisaka 1996, Goto-Jones 2005 and 2008, Heisig and Maraldo 1994, Matsumaru 2003, 
Williams 2004 and Yusa 2002. For less sympathetic readings of Nishida’s position during the Second 
World War, see Hiromatsu 1989, Harootunian 2000 and Lavelle 1996.
115　 See Yamagata 2007, pp. 1–22.
116　 Granet 1934, pp. 23–24. 
117　 Nishida 1940, p. 387. Nishida 1970, p. 237 (429). 
118　 Nishida 1940, pp. 279, 339. See Dalissier 2005, p. 587, as well as Dalissier 2009a, pp. 19, 106, 
223 ff . 
119　 See for example in Zhuangzi, Billeter 2004, p. 38.
120　 “To know the name. Saying the name is possessing being or creating something. All beasts are 
tamed by the one who knows how to name them,” Granet 1934, p. 41. Cheng 1997, p. 145, 477. 
Granet 1934, p. 84.
121　 Dalissier 2009a, p. 353 ff .
122　 Billeter 2004, pp. 17–18, 50. Th is account of the Zhuangzi comes closer to the logic of place: 
the fi rst steps might correspond to the visual place of determinate being in its mass and inertia; the 
second, to the breach opened in being as a place of nothingness opposing parts in more and more skill-
ful action; the third, to the place of absolute nothingness as the site of pure creative operation bodily 
expressing spirit. But J.-F. Billeter shows that we need to describe a fourth level, in which conscious 
activity “takes a certain distance from the activity of the body, taking the attitude of an ironical spec-
tator. . .toward what happens inside ourselves,” and acts as a “limited control, as simple supervision” 
of incorporated and necessary gestures. Here we encounter the mastering level of experience of 游, 
Billeter 2004, pp. 67–69, 95. Now, might we argue further that such an inner operation is similar to 
Nishida’s practical and poiesistic application of the logic of place as intuition in action, in which to 
produce is to see the product?
123　 “Whereas the intellect can never know with certitude, the hand knows what it is doing with an 
infallible reliability; it knows how to do what language cannot say,” Cheng 1997, p. 127.
124　 Cheng 1997, p. 37. See also pp. 58, 66, 122–123, 127 and Roetz in Cheng 2005, p. 54.
125　 Cheng 1997, p. 66.
126　 Nishida 1970, p. 250 (447).
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127　 Nishida 1940, pp. 33, 218, 268, 289.
128　 Nishida 1940, pp. 356–57, 338–40, 363.
129　 Blocker and Starling 2001, pp. 74, 91, 95, 106.
130　 Th is aspect can be seen in the afore mentioned quotation: “Th e teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi 
deny the actual world in the direction of the noesis [act of knowledge],” Nishida 1970, pp. 244, 438.
131　 Nishida 1939b, pp. 258, 277–78, 284. Nishida 1939a, p. 326 ff .
132　 Nishida 1940, p. 289. See Dalissier 2009a, p. 24 ff .
133　 Dalissier 2008b, pp. 30–33, 47.
134　 Ricoeur 1990, p. 80 quoting E. Anscombe. Ricoeur 1992, p. 62.
135　 Ricoeur 1990, p. 91, Ricoeur 1992, p. 72.
136　 Ricoeur 1990, pp. 131–134, 204–206, Ricoeur 1992, pp. 107–110, 174–76.
137　 Dalissier 2008b, pp. 24–27.
138　 Nishida 1940, p. 370–71.
139　 Nishida’s quotation (造次心於是顛沛心於是), in Nishida 1939b, p. 303, refers to the Ana-
lects, Rijin 4 里仁 第四, Lunyü 1978, p. 76:君子無終食之閒違仁。造次心於是。顛沛心於是 : 
“Th e man of goodness does not separate himself from virtue. Even during his lunch, he always stays 
[or stands] here; even when he is busy, he always stays here.” We note the topological implication of 
the fact of standing or staying here (於是).
140　 We might recall here the words of Yusa mentioned above, p. 145.
141　 See NKZ 1987, vol. 12, pp. 160, 360.
142　 Nishida 1970, pp. 237–251 (429–448).
143　 Nishida 1970, pp. 246–251, 254 (441–448, 452).
144　 Nishida 1970, pp. 238–240, 244–245 (430–434, 438).
145　 Voltaire and the philosophers of the Enlightenment also had this vision. See Dyck in Cheng 
2005, p. 21.
146　 Nishida 1940, pp. 370–71.
147　 Th is is the “intuition in action” (kōiteki chokkan) in which we rejoin the world of objectivity 
through the level of the act, Nishida 1970, pp. 244–46 (438–41).
148　 Nishida himself used all kinds of symbolism to express his thought, as can be seen in particular 
in several essays entitled “Schematic Explanations” Zushikiteki setsumei?図式的説明 NKZ 2002–
2009, vol. 13, pp. 219–66, 572–89, vol. 9, pp. 305–35.
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要旨
西田幾多郎と中国哲学：影響と相違
ミシェル・ダリシエ
　本稿は、筆者による西田幾多郎と中国哲学との関係を考察した研
究論文の続編にあたる。前編の “Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy”
は、西田哲学がどれだけの直接的もしくは間接的、明示的もしくは
暗示的、歴史的もしくは概念的な影響を中国思想の知的土壌を基盤
とする史料や人物から受けたかを考究したものである。続編である
本稿では、西田が理解するところの中国哲学に対する西田自身の姿
勢に焦点を絞る。この中国哲学なるものが西田の著作のなかで中心
的な位置を占めているのかどうか、そうであるとするならば、この「中
心」なる概念を我々はどう理解すれば良いのか。本稿では、西田哲
学に現れる中国思想の複数の原型を提示するとともに、西田という
日本の哲学者と彼の知的背景としての中国哲学との間に認識できる、
方法論的、論理的、形而上学的な対照に光を当てるものである。
